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Abstract Modal fictionalists face a problem that arises due to their possible-world
story being incomplete in the sense that certain relevant claims are neither true nor
false according to it. It has recently been suggested that this incompleteness prob-
lem generalises to other brands of fictionalism, such as fictionalism about composite
or mathematical objects. In this paper, I argue that these fictionalist positions are
particularly threatened by a generalised incompleteness problem since they cannot
emulate the modal fictionalists’ most attractive response. I then defend mathematical
and compositional fictionalism by showing that the reasons for which the incomplete-
ness problem has been thought to affect them are mistaken. This leads to the question
of whether there are other fictionalist positions to which the problem does in fact
generalise. I give a general account of the features of a fictionalist position that gen-
erate the incompleteness problem and argue that whenever a fictionalist position does
exemplify these features then the problem can be addressed in analogy to the modal
fictionalists’ preferred response.
Keywords Fictionalism · Possible worlds · Mathematical objects ·
Composite objects · Fictional incompleteness
1 Modal fictionalism and the incompleteness problem
Modal realists endorse all instances of the following schema
(R-Mod) φ ↔ [φ]T
where φ is an ordinary modal sentence and [φ]T is φ’s regimentation in the realists’
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possible-world language. Following Rosen (1990), modal fictionalists want to exploit
the benefits of the realists’ possible-world language without incurring ontological
commitment to any possible worlds other than the actual one. To do so, they replace
the realists’ schema (R-Mod) with the following schema:
(F-Mod) φ ↔ According to PW , [φ]T
Here, the right-hand side is what we might call a meta-fictional sentence which says
of the possible-world fiction PW—standardly taken to be some suitable formulation
of modal realism—that the sentence [φ]T holds according to it. Modal fictionalists
now face a problem that arises from the fact that modal realism—and consequently the
possible-world fiction PW—is incomplete. The standard example relates to Lewis’s
recombination principle.1 Following Rosen (1990, p. 333), we can spell out this prin-
ciple as follows:
(RP) For any collection of concrete objects from any number of worlds, there
is a single world containing any number of non-overlapping duplicates of
each, provided there is a spacetime large enough to hold them.
The crucial aspect is the unspecific restriction after the last comma. It is a restriction
because it ensures that the principle doesn’t allow for the combination of any number
of concrete non-overlapping objects in a single world, but requires the number to fall
below an upper bound to be determined by the maximum possible size of spacetime.
The restriction is unspecific, because despite asserting the existence of such an upper
bound λ and locating λ within the infinite cardinals, Lewis explicitly intends modal
realism to be agnostic about exactly which cardinal λ is (cf. 1986, Sects. 1.8, 2.2).
Now, let κ be some infinite cardinal larger than the number of concrete non-
overlapping objects that actually exist and let [k]T be the sentence of the possible-world
language that says that there is a world containing κ objects. Then consider the sen-
tence:
(1) According to PW , [k]T
On the face of it, (1) is false. It erroneously asserts that PW endorses the existence of
a world with κ objects. But in fact PW does no such thing. For whether there is such a
world according to PW depends on whether κ ≤ λ. And since PW is silent on exactly
which number λ is, it must consequently also be silent on whether there is a world
with κ objects. So (1) is false, and its negation is true:
(¬1) ¬(According to PW , [k]T )
But now consider:
(2) According to PW , [¬k]T
If (1) is false, then so is (2). PW doesn’t assert the existence of a world with κ objects,
but it doesn’t rule out its existence either. Thus we also have:
1 See for instance Rosen (1990, Sect. 7), Chihara (1998, pp. 175–177), Sider (2002, p. 314), Fine (2003,
p. 117); Brogaard (2006, p. 81), Nolan (2011, Sect. 4.2), Woodward (2012, p. 782)
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(¬2) ¬(According to PW , [¬k]T )
The conjunction of the sentences (¬1) and (¬2) constitutes what we will call an
incompleteness sentence for modal fictionalists:
(Inc-Mod) ¬(According to PW , [k]T ) ∧ ¬(According to PW , [¬k]T )
Taken by itself, such an incompleteness sentence is unproblematic. Modal realists, for
example, can happily accept it. It is only in the hands of the modal fictionalists that
(Inc-Mod) becomes problematic. For the following are instances of the fictionalist
schema (F-Mod):
(F-Mod-1) k ↔ According to PW, [k]T
(F-Mod-2) ¬k ↔ According to PW, [¬k]T
And in tandem with (Inc-Mod) these instances entail a contradiction:
(Con-Mod) ¬k ∧ ¬¬k
The incompleteness problem for modal fictionalism thus consists in the fictionalists’
being forced to march from incompleteness to inconsistency via two instances of their
schema.
2 The threat of a general incompleteness problem
Fictionalism about possibilia is just one instance of a general fictionalist strategy.
Along similar lines, mathematical fictionalists (following Field 1980, 1989) try to
eschew numbers and sets, while compositional fictionalists (followingDorr and Rosen
2002) seek to avoid commitment to molecules and tables. It is thus not surprising
that certain problems which are first discovered in the context of a particular fic-
tionalism subsequently prove to affect an entire family of fictionalist positions. For
example, the Brock–Rosen objection (Brock 1993; Rosen 1993), originally directed
at modal fictionalism, was found to be a structural problem encountered by a variety
of fictionalisms (Nolan and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1996). It is thus a natural question
to ask whether the modal fictionalists’ incompleteness problem also generalises to
other brands of fictionalism. Woodward (2012) proposes a positive answer to this
question. In particular, he suggests that the problem affects mathematical and compo-
sitional fictionalists, since certain theories—upon which they might want to base their
fictions—give rise to incompleteness sentences.
In the case of mathematical fictionalism, Woodward considers fictionalists about
sets who choose Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF) as their fiction of choice. ZF leaves
the continuum hypothesis unsettled, so that if we let [c]T be the regimentation of this
hypothesis into the language of ZF we have:
(Inc-Math) ¬(According to ZF, [c]T ) ∧ ¬(According to ZF, [¬c]T )
What about compositional fictionalists? According to Woodward, they are likely to
face an incompleteness problem too, but this time he doesn’t provide us with an
example of an incompleteness sentence. If we think of the relevant fiction as endorsing
an entirely unrestricted principle of composition, examples are indeed hard to come
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by. But compositional fictionalists might well be interested in basing their composition
story,CS, on a principle that is closer to common sense than a principle of unrestricted
composition. Such a principle will say that some given objects compose another object
only if they fulfil a certain condition. For example, this condition might be that the
objects are suitably spatio-temporally cohesive. Now suppose there are two objects,
say a cup and a saucer, which neither clearly meet the composition condition nor
clearly fail to meet it. Let [o]T be the CS-regimentation of the claim that there is an
object composed of the cup and the saucer. It now seems thatCS neither endorses [o]T
nor its negation, so that we can construct an incompleteness sentence for this fiction
too:
(Inc-Comp) ¬(According to CS, [o]T ) ∧ ¬(According to CS, [¬o]T )
Given that we can replicate incompleteness sentences for mathematical and composi-
tional fictionalism a general incompleteness problem doesn’t seem far fetched. What
is more, I submit that if the problem does indeed affect mathematical and composi-
tional fictionalism, it will be more recalcitrant in these cases than in the case of modal
fictionalism. This is because one of the more attractive responses to the problem avail-
able to modal fictionalists proves unavailable to their mathematical and compositional
counterparts.
The response I have in mind has been first proposed by Fine (2003) and has since
found approval in Brogaard (2006) and Nolan (2011, supplement to Sect. 4.2). It starts
from the observation that, for all its benefits,modal fictionalism is nowwidely regarded
as not allowing for a reduction of the modal to the non-modal (see for instance Nolan
1997). The main idea is then that non-reductive modal fictionalists can invoke modal
material in specifying the content of their fiction in a way that ensures the fiction’s
completeness.
We can spell out thismodal content response as follows. In a first step, non-reductive
modal fictionalists can regard PW as straightforwardly endorsing the realists’ schema:
(R-Mod) φ ↔ [φ]T
When conceived of in this way, PW thus contains the two following biconditionals:
(R-Mod-1) It is possible that there are κ objects↔ there is aworld that contains
κ objects
(R-Mod-2) It is not possible that there are κ objects ↔ there is no world that
contains κ objects
In a second step, non-reductive modal fictionalists can incorporate all the ordinary
modal truths into their fiction. Since there are infinitely many such truths they cannot,
of course, incorporate them into the fiction’s explicit content by writing them all down.
But then they needn’t. As Lewis points out we are familiar with regarding the content
of a fiction as a joint product of its explicit content and a background of genuine truths
carried over into the fiction ‘not because there is anything explicit in the fiction to
make them true, but rather because there is nothing to make them false’ (1978, p. 42).
The fictionalists can thus regard the modal truths as part of the background of facts
implicitly carried over into the content of PW in the same way in which a truth such
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as ‘water is H2O’ is implicitly carried over into the content of the Holmes-stories.2
PW will then contain either
(R-Mod-1a) It is possible that there are κ objects.
or
(R-Mod-2a) It is not possible that there are κ objects.
depending on which of these sentences in fact happens to be true.
It should be clear that once PW is conceived of in this way, it is guaranteed to be
immune to the incompleteness problem. If in fact (R-Mod-1a) is true then it will be
part of the fiction. Since the fiction also contains the biconditional (R-Mod-1), it will
also endorse
(R-Mod-1b) There is a world that contains κ objects
in which case the left conjunct of (Inc-Mod) is false:
(Inc-Mod) ¬(According to PW , [k]T ) ∧ ¬(According to PW , [¬k]T )
If, on the other hand, (R-Mod-2a) is true then the fiction will by the same reasoning
endorse
(R-Mod-2b) There is no world that contains κ objects
thus rendering the right conjunct of (Inc-Mod) false. Either way the incompleteness
sentence is guaranteed to be false and the problem is thereby avoided.
Now it is hard to see how mathematical and compositional fictionalists could deal
with incompleteness in an analogous way. For note that the modal content response
exploits the fact that the term ‘modal fictionalism’ is somewhat misleading. Modal
fictionalists reject possible worlds; they don’t reject modality. This is why we could
advise them to include all the ordinary modal truths into the content of their fiction,
2 Note that while modal fictionalists can appeal to the general phenomenon of background facts being
implicitly carried over into fictions to motivate this step, they cannot straightforwardly appeal to Lewis’s
(1978) particular account of this phenomenon which invokes possible worlds. This, however, should not
be held against the modal content response. For even modal fictionalists who don’t go in for the modal
content response will find themselves in exactly the same situation. To see this, compare Rosen’s (1990,
Sect. 3) original conception of PW with the present conception.
On Rosen’s conception, PW contains Lewis’s recombination principle: (RP) from Sect. 1. As Rosen
acknowledges, (RP) is itself insufficient to generate possible world sentences. To do so, (RP) needs to
be combined with what Rosen calls an Encyclopedia: ‘a list of the non-modal truths about the intrinsic
character of this universe’ (p. 335). The idea is that by incorporating the Encyclopedia into PW we ensure
that PW recognizes the existence of a suitable ‘starter kit’ of objects from which all the required possibila
can be generated by recombination.
In comparison, on the present way of spelling out the modal content response PW contains the realists’
schema (R-Mod), which itself is insufficient to generate the required possible world sentences. To do so,
(R-Mod) needs to be combined with a list of the modal truths (call this list the Compendium).
Now, what holds of our Compendium equally holds of Rosen’s Enyclopedia: a ‘list of the non-modal
truths about the intrinsic character of this universe’ cannot be explicitly included into PW any more than
a list of the modal truths. So whether or not modal fictionalists go in for the modal content response, they
will have to rely on the idea that a large body of truths can be implicitly incorporated into PW ’s content,
without being able to explain this phenomenon in terms of Lewis’s possible world account. Thanks to an
anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this issue.
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so that these truths, in tandem with the realist schema, could generate the required
possible world sentences. In the case of mathematical and compositional fictionalism,
the analogous move is unavailable. For instance, compositional fictionalists maintain
that, in fact, there aren’t any composite objects. So they can’t make their composition
story complete by incorporating all the compositional truths into it. For if they are right
about what these truths are, then doing this would just turn the fiction into a testimony
of their compositional nihilism and thereby render it useless for their purposes. The
same appliesmutatis mutandis to mathematical fictionalists, so that they cannot easily
complete their fiction either.
With the generalisation of the modal content response having failed, it might be
hoped that there is another, similarly attractive response available to the modal fic-
tionalist which can furthermore be generalised to other brands of fictionalism. Nolan
(2011) suggests that fictionalists can avoid the incompleteness problem by restricting
their schema (F-Mod) rather than by ensuring the fiction’s completeness.3 In particular,
Nolan suggests replacing the fictionalist schemawith the following (2011, supplement
to Sect. 4.2):
(F-Mod-Res) φ ↔ According to PW , [φ]T
(unless PW is silent about [φ]T , in which case φ is truth-valueless)
It is clear that retreating from (F-Mod) to (F-Mod-Res) blocks the derivation of (Con-
Mod) from (Inc-Mod). However, avoiding the incompleteness problem in this way is
not in fact advisable to modal fictionalists.
For one thing, Nolan’s particular suggestion has it that the ordinary modal sentence
φ is truth-valueless whenever the story is incomplete with regard to the correspond-
ing possible world sentence [φ]T . Nolan’s restriction response is thus committed to
non-classical truth-values (and, accordingly, to non-classical connectiveswhich render
conjunctionswith truth-valueless conjuncts false, and disjunctionswith truth-valueless
disjuncts true). In this regard it is very similar to Rosen’s (1990, Sect. 7) original
response to the incompleteness problem which makes do without a restriction of the
schema at the cost of regarding not only the modal sentence φ but also the correspond-
ing meta-fictional sentence ‘According to PW , [φ]T ’ as truth-valueless whenever the
fiction is silent on [φ]T .
In virtue of this similarity,Nolan’s restriction response inherits one of themain prob-
lems of Rosen’s original proposal. As Rosen admits, invoking non-classical machinery
appears hopelessly ad hoc if this is done for the mere purpose of fixing a bug in the
fictionalist’s theory. Such a move might be justifiable in an attempt to account for
general semantic phenomena such as vagueness or the liar paradox. But in the present
case the fictionalist is applying it to discourse where ‘our ordinary ways of thinking
give us no reason to expect a complicated propositional logic, and where the only
reason for proposing one is, to say the least, generated by concerns rather distant from
the linguistic practice in question’ (Rosen 1990, p. 343).
NowNolan’s claim that φ is truth-valueless when the story is silent on [φ]T doesn’t
appear essential to the restriction strategy. The fictionalist could impose the restriction
as before but maintain that when the story is silent on [φ]T then φ and ¬φ receive
3 Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting the ensuing discussion of the restriction strategy.
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opposite classical truth-values, although we might not be able to tell which sentence
receives which truth-value. This way the restriction strategy dodges the charge of
making an ad hoc appeal to non-classical resources. This is not to say that the strategy
doesn’t still appear somewhat ad hoc or at least inelegant. But in fact there is a much
more significant reason to reject even this improved restriction strategy.
One of the main reasons why modal fictionalists want to preserve the right to talk
in possible world terms is that it enables them to do ‘modal logic by proxy’ (Divers
1999, Sect. V). That is, when confronted with an argument couched in modal terms,
ψ ∴ φ, fictionalists want to consider the corresponding argument couched in possible
world terms, [φ]T ∴ [ψ]T , and will want to take the validity of the latter to reveal
the validity of the former. Apart from making inferences more tractable, this is taken
to have an advantage of conceptual economy: the validity of an argument couched in
modal language reduces to the validity of an argument in the first order language of
counterpart theory (cf. Divers 1999, p. 329; Woodward 2010, p. 410).
As Divers points out, in order for fictionalists to be justified in doing modal logic
by proxy, they had better be able to establish the following principle:
(Safety) If the PW -sentence [φ]T entails the PW -sentence [ψ]T , then the
modal sentence φ entails the modal sentence ψ .
Fortunately, Divers has also shown how (Safety) can be established (1999 Sect. VI,
see also Woodward 2010, Sect. 2). In brief, the strategy is as follows. Given a modal
conception of entailment, the task is that of establishing the strict conditional (φ →
ψ) on assumption of ([φ]T → [ψ]T ). To do this we assume φ for conditional proof.
By appealing to the fictionalist biconditional (F-Mod) we derive ‘According to PW ,
[φ]T ’. This, together with ([φ]T → [ψ]T ), yields ‘According to PW , [ψ]T ’ on the
assumption that the story operator is closed under entailment. By appealing again to
(F-Mod) we derive ψ . Discharging the assumption of φ, this yields φ → ψ . To arrive
at the desired necessitation of this conditional, Divers argues that the fictionalist is
entitled to assume the necessitations of all the assumption appealed to in the proof.
This guarantees the truth of(φ → ψ) given the principle (which holds in any system
at least as strong as S4) that whenever ψ follows from φ1, ..., φn , then ψ follows
from φ1, ..., φn .
Now the problem for the restriction strategy is this: modal fictionalists will want to
be able to domodal logic by proxy evenwhen confrontedwith amodal argumentwhich
contains a sentence whose possible world paraphrase is not settled by the fiction. Just
because we don’t know whether the modal sentence k is true (i.e. don’t know whether
it is possible that there are κ many individuals) doesn’t mean that we should not be
interested in the validity of arguments which contain k as a premiss or as conclusion.
Quite the contrary, evaluating such arguments might well play an important part in
coming to know whether the sentence is true. But a fictionalist who employs the
restriction strategy won’t be able to justify the practice of doing modal logic by proxy
when it comes to any such argument. As we have seen the justification of this practice
requires establishing (Safety) for the relevant argument. And establishing (Safety) for
an argument that features the modal sentence k will require invoking ‘k ↔ According




Unless modal fictionalists are prepared to give up the right to do modal logic by
proxy in some important cases, they are thus well advised to address the incomplete-
ness problem in a way that preserves the fictionalist schema (F-Mod). As we have
seen, the modal content response is a simple and attractive way to do this. It is not the
only way. We have already mentioned Rosen’s original proposal with its commitment
to non-classical truth-values for both modal and meta-fictional sentences. A further
alternative is provided by Woodward (2012) whose solution to the incompleteness
problem commits him to an analysis of the story operator in terms of counterfactual
conditional that supports counterfactual excludedmiddle (p. 785), and involves regard-
ing modal sentences such as k as either truth-valueless, metaphysically indeterminate
or in principle unknowable (pp. 788–789). What makes the modal content response
so attractive is that it makes do without such controversial commitments.
Unfortunately, we have seen that the modal content response doesn’t generalise
to mathematical and compositional fictionalism. A general incompleteness problem
thus has the potential to seriously upset these fictionalists. But not only them. If the
problem affects compositional and mathematical fictionalists, this will also indirectly
affectmodal fictionalists. Forwhile they can ensure their fiction’s completeness via the
modal content response, this response will appear much less attractive if the problem
also arises for their compositional and mathematical brethren who cannot react to it in
an analogous way. A general problem, it might reasonably be said, requires a general
solution, so that the modal content response, though effective in the particular case for
which it was designed, will appear less satisfactory due to its limited scope.
3 Undermining the threat for mathematical and compositional
fictionalism
Given the explosive nature of a positive answer to the generalisation question, fic-
tionalists are well advised to have a closer look at the precise reasoning given in
support of it. In the previous section we agreed with Woodward that mathematical
and compositional fictionalism are prone to incompleteness sentences. But this falls
short of establishing that these positions face an incompleteness problem. For taken
by themselves (Inc-Math) and (Inc-Comp) are no more problematic than (Inc-Mod)
was. In the case of modal fictionalism, remember, it was only the combination of (Inc-
Mod) with the modal fictionalist schema (F-Mod) that gave rise to the problem. So
what are the analogous schemas that mathematical and compositional fictionalists are
supposed to endorse and whose instances are supposed to give rise to a contradiction
when combined with the relevant incompleteness sentence?
To understand Woodward’s answer, we must first get clear on his interpretation of
the modal fictionalists’ schema:
(F-Mod) φ ↔ According to PW , [φ]T
So far we have taken the modal fictionalists’ position to be exhaustively characterised
by their endorsement of what we may call the the modal instances of this schema:
the instances that result from replacing φ with an ordinary modal sentence. This,
however, seems insufficient to achieve one of their central ambitions. For besides
providing a deflationary account of ordinary modal discourse, an important aim of
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modal fictionalism has always been to enable guilt-free indulgence in unqualified
possible world talk. Endorsing all and only the modal instances of (F-Mod) reflects
the former aim but doesn’t help with the latter. To remedy this shortcoming, Liggins
(2008) suggests that themodal fictionalists’ schema should not be restricted to ordinary
modal sentences. Rather it should also be seen as providing an ontologically harmless
semantics for sentences explicitly quantifying over possible worlds. According to this
account, modal fictionalists not only endorse the modal instances of (F-Mod) but
additionally assert what we may call its worldly instances: the instances which result
from replacing φ with a sentence explicitly quantifying over possible worlds, such as
(F-Mod-3) There is a possible world that contains a blue swan ↔ According
to PW, there is a possible world that contains a blue swan.
Importantly, when it comes to such worldly instances of the schema, fictionalists
are taken to give the right-hand side ‘semantic priority’ (Liggins 2008, p. 153).
That is, in accordance with their anti-realism about possible worlds, when fictionalists
endorse such aworldly instance they take the left-hand side to express the ontologically
harmless meta-fictional proposition more perspicuously expressed by the right-hand
side.
Now,Woodward (2012, p. 782, fn. 2; 2008, Sect. 2) follows Liggins in this interpre-
tation of the fictionalist schema in all important respects.4 And he takes mathematical
and compositional fictionalists to similarly offer an ontologically harmless seman-
tics for talk about mathematical and compositional objects. That is, he takes them to
endorse all those biconditionals that result from the relevant schema by replacing φ
with a sentence explicitly quantifying, respectively, over sets or composite objects:
(F-Math) φ ↔ According to ZF, [φ]T
(F-Comp) φ ↔ According to CS, [φ]T
Thus according toWoodward, the compositional fictionalist endorses, for example, the
following instances of (F-Comp), where o is the claim that there is an object composed
of the cup and the saucer:
(F-Comp-1) o ↔ According to CS, [o]T
(F-Comp-2) ¬o ↔ According to CS, [¬o]T
And it is these instances which Woodward takes to give rise to a contradiction when
combined with the incompleteness sentence for CS:
(Inc-Comp) ¬(According to CS, [o]T ) ∧ ¬(According to CS, [¬o]T )
After all this trio allows us to infer
(Con-Comp) ¬o ∧ ¬¬o
4 Woodward’s presentation of the fictionalist position differs from Liggins’s in that he formulates the
fictionalist schemas in a metalinguistic fashion: ‘φ’ is true ↔ According to The Fiction, [φ]T . This
difference is not important for the present discussion; the reason for which the incompleteness problem
doesn’t carry over to mathematical and compositional fictionalism is not sensitive to the choice between
the standard version of the schema and its meta-linguistic variant.
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At this point itmight thus appear that compositional fictionalists indeedfind themselves
marching from incompleteness to inconsistency. Of course, analogous reasoning will
have mathematical fictionalists join them on this unpleasant journey.
I believe, however, that closer inspection will reveal that we are dealing with a
fictional problem rather than a problem for fictionalism. For although (Con-Comp)
might look contradictory, in fact it isn’t. To see this, first consider the left conjunct
of (Con-Comp), the sentence ¬o, which is derived from the left conjunct of (Inc-
Comp) together with (F-Comp-1). And remember that o is the sentence ‘there is an
object composed of the cup and the saucer’ which explicitly quantifies over composite
objects. The compositional fictionalist can only be seen as endorsing (F-Comp-1)
given that the right-hand side is taken to enjoy semantic priority. For if o, as it occurs
on its left-hand side, were taken at face value, rather than as expressing the meta-
fictional proposition that is more perspicuously expressed by the right-hand side,
asserting this instance would undermine the compositional fictionalists’ anti-realism
about composite objects.
But then we must of course keep this fact in mind when we use (F-Comp-1) in our
inference. So when we combine (Inc-Comp) and (F-Comp-1) to derive the negation of
(F-comp-1)’s left-hand side, ¬o, we must keep in mind that here the negated sentence,
o, really expresses the propositionmore perspicuously expressed by ‘According toCS,
[o]T ’. But then then the derived sentence, ¬o, expresses the negation of that proposi-
tion, i.e. it expresses the proposition more perspicuously expressed by ‘¬(According
to CS, [o]T )’.
So, compositional fictionalists are indeed committed to the sentence that constitutes
the left conjunct of (Con-Comp). But from their perspective the proposition expressed
by this sentence can bemore perspicuously expressed by the negation of the right-hand
side of (F-comp-1):
¬(According to CS, [o]T )
It should now be clear that commitment to (Con-Comp) is unproblematic. Analogous
reasoning, when applied to the derivation of the right conjunct of (Con-Comp), the
sentence ¬¬o, shows that this sentence must really be taken to express the proposition
more perspicuously expressed by the negation of the right-hand side of (F-comp-2):
¬(According to CS, [¬o]T )
So if we keep inmind the assumptionswe have tomake in order to derive (Con-Comp),
we can see this sentence doesn’t really express a contradictory proposition. In fact,
(Con-Comp) just expresses the proposition more perspicuously expressed by:
(Con-Comp*) ¬(According to CS, [o]T ) ∧ ¬(According to CS, [¬o]T )
And this is nothing but the harmless incompleteness sentence we started out with.
Accepting the incompleteness sentence (Inc-Comp) thus doesn’t lead compositional
fictionalists to a contradiction.
OnWoodward’s account, themathematical fictionalists’ take on (F-Math) is just the
same as the compositional fictionalists’ take on (F-Comp). The argument thus equally
applies to them, showing that mathematical fictionalists don’t end up being committed
to a contradictory proposition as a result of accepting (Inc-Math) either. For the same
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reason the argument also shows that it is only the modal instances, and not the worldly
instances, that generate the problem in the case of modal fictionalism.
The upshot of this is that even if the compositional or mathematical fictionalists’
stories give rise to incompleteness sentences, Woodward’s considerations don’t in fact
provide any reason to believe that they face an incompleteness problem.
Accordingly, there is no need for these fictionalists to reject the incompleteness
sentences (Inc-Comp) and (Inc-Math). This is good news for compositional and math-
ematical fictionalists, since we have seen that they would have been hard-pressed to do
so with the most attractive defensive manoeuvre available to the modal fictionalists,
the modal content response, being unavailable to them.
4 Undermining the threat in general
We have seen that the incompleteness problem doesn’t arise for mathematical and
compositional fictionalists in the way suggested by Woodward. Can it still arise for
these or other types of fictionalism in some other shape or form? We are now in a
better position to see which structural features of a fictionalist position are responsible
for the problem’s arising and this will enable us to arrive at a more general conclusion.
The discussion in the previous section shows that the following two features of a
fictionalist position, based on a given fiction f , are not sufficient for this position to
face an incompleteness problem:
(i) Fiction f gives rise to an incompleteness sentence:
¬(According to f , [p]T ) ∧ ¬(According to f , [¬p]T )
(ii) Thefictionalist subscribes to a schemawith the following instances:
p ↔ According to f , [p]T
¬p ↔ According to f , [¬p]T
Instead, the problem only arises if the position additionally has the following feature:
(iii) The fictionalists do not assign semantic priority to the right-hand
side of the fictionalist schema. That is, they do not regard the
left-hand sides as expressing the meta-fictional propositions more
perspicuously expressed by the right-hand sides.
The reason why the incompleteness problem doesn’t arise for mathematical and com-
positional fictionalism as conceived by Woodward is that they exhibit the first two
features but not the third. And this isn’t an artifact of Woodward’s presentation. These
fictionalists could only be portrayed as endorsing the relevant instances of the schemas
(F-Comp) and (F-Math)—without thereby undermining their fictionalist credentials—
because it had been ensured that they assign semantic priority to the right-hand sides
of these schemas.
In contrast, some—but not all—modal fictionalist positions will satisfy all three
conditions and will thus be susceptible to the incompleteness problem. Following
Nolan (1997) we can distinguish between timid and strong modal fictionalists. Both
camps endorse all the instances of the schema (F-Mod) which result from replac-
ing φ with an ordinary modal sentence. But strong modal fictionalists additionally
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take the content of the ordinary modal sentence to coincide with the meta-fictional
proposition expressed by the right-hand side. Timid modal fictionalists in contrast,
endorse the schema but take the modal sentences at face value, i.e. take these sen-
tences to express propositions which are distinct from the meta-fictional propositions
expressed by the right-hand sides of the schema. In doing so they exemplify feature
(iii). It is thus only timid modal fictionalism which exhibits the three features that gen-
erate the incompleteness problem. Strong modal fictionalism, on the other hand, will
take modal instances of (F-Mod) to have just the same content as the corresponding
worldly instances. And we have seen in the previous section that those instances don’t
generate an inconsistency. In this regard, the incompleteness problem thus turns out
to be less general than anticipated, since it doesn’t even arise on all varieties of modal
fictionalism.
Is there room (and motivation) for other fictionalisms to endorse a schema in a
fashion relevantly similar to the timid modal fictionalists’ endorsement of (F-Mod)?
That is, might some fictionalists wish to tie the truth-values of the sentences in a certain
domain of discourse (analogous to the ordinary modal sentences) via some schema
(analogous to F-Mod) to meta-fictional sentences (analogous to the ‘According to
PW ’-sentences) while taking the original sentences at face value?
Perhaps. Consider presentists who refuse to accept the existence of any times other
than the present. Presentistsmight stillwish to join their eternalist opponents in spelling
out the truth-conditions for sentences containing tense operators, such as ‘it was the
case that there exists a dinosaur’, in terms of quantifications over past times, as in ‘there
is a time t earlier than the present time such that at t there exists a dinosaur’. But,
qua presentists, they will want to do so without being ontologically committed to such
non-present times. To this end, the presentists might consider adopting a fictionalist
attitude towards eternalism (ET ).5 This will involve rejecting the eternalists’ schema6
(R-Time) φ ↔ [φ]T
and replacing it with the fictionalist schema
(F-Time) φ ↔ According to ET , [φ]T
Such temporal fictionalists might well be timid in that they continue to take the tensed
sentences at face value rather than as expressing meta-fictional propositions. This
fictionalist position will thus exemplify features (ii) and (iii). Whether it faces an
incompleteness problem accordingly depends on whether an incompleteness sentence
can be constructed for the eternalist fiction. However, we are now in a position to see
that even if this were the case, it shouldn’t cause too much concern. In Sect. 2 we saw
that what made the possibility of a generalised incompleteness problem so menacing
was theworry that themost attractive response available tomodal fictionalistswouldn’t
generalise in step. Having acquired a better understanding of the structural features
responsible for the problem, we can now dispel this worry.
5 Combining presentism with a fictionalist attitude towards eternalism is contemplated by Sider (1999,
p. 21, n. 30).
6 Similar to the modal realists’ schema (R-Mod), φ is an ordinary tensed sentence and [φ]T is φ’s regi-
mentation in the eternalists’ time-committing language.
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As we’ve seen, the modal fictionalists can guarantee their fiction’s completeness
by incorporating all the modal facts into its content. We can now see that this works
precisely because they can adopt a timid attitude towards their schema, i.e. because
they can, without undermining their fictionalism about worlds, regard ordinary modal
sentences as expressing truths when taken at face value.
Now the timid temporal fictionalists will also be able to employ this strategy. They
can, without undermining their fictionalism about times, regard tensed sentences, such
as ‘it was the case that there exists a dinosaur’, as true while taking them at face value.
And this allows them to embrace a tensed content response in analogy to the modal
content response: they can ensure the fiction’s completeness by incorporating all the
ordinary tensed truths into its content. This is no coincidence. The very structural
similarity to timid modal fictionalism that made timid tensed fictionalism susceptible
to the incompleteness problem at the same time ensures that the modal fictionalists’
preferred response strategy can be carried over: the incompleteness problem can only
arise when the fictionalists connect a range of target sentences with meta-fictional
sentence while taking the target sentences at face value, thus exhibiting features (ii)
and (iii). But it is precisely these features which in turn allow them to ensure the
fiction’s completeness via incorporating the relevant truths—those expressed by the
target sentences when taken at face value—into their fiction, thereby making sure that
feature (i) is not instantiated.
The incompleteness problem, then,maynot be localised to timidmodal fictionalism.
But it can only generalise to fictionalisms whose structural similarity to timid modal
fictionalism ensures that the problem can be addressed in away analogous to themodal
fictionalists’ preferred response.
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